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Abstract: The aim of the article is to answer the 
question of whether the limitations of the access 
to unapproved therapies outside of clinical trials 
are permissible in light of the modern paradigm 
of health care which is based on the patients’ 
autonomy of will. We only focus on the therapies 
consisting in the provision of unregistered 
medicinal products. The law is often restrictive in 
allowing patients to be provided with experimental 
therapies even if they grant fully informed consent. 
The Czech law and a recent Czech case of an 
unapproved stem cell therapy provide a basis for the 
analysis of the problem with universally applicable 
conclusions. We argue that the regulation of access 
to unapproved therapies serves an important 
public interest of the protection of public trust in 
the health system and hence is justified. The law 
should only permit access to experimental therapies 
that have sufficient scientific justifications. Under 
certain conditions, the patients can be allowed to 
cover the costs of the therapy.
Keywords: Health law. Unapproved therapies. 
Stem cell therapies. Medical paternalism. The 
Czech Republic.
Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é responder 
sobre se são permitidas as limitações do acesso a 
terapias não aprovadas fora dos ensaios clínicos, 
à luz do paradigma moderno dos cuidados de 
saúde, que se baseia na autonomia de vontade 
dos pacientes. O debate do texto se concentra 
nas terapias que consistem no fornecimento de 
medicamentos não registrados. A lei é muitas 
vezes restritiva ao permitir que os pacientes 
recebam terapias experimentais, mesmo que 
concedam consentimento totalmente informado. 
A lei tcheca e um recente caso tcheco de terapia 
com células-tronco não aprovada fornecem uma 
base para a análise do problema com conclusões 
universalmente aplicáveis. Argumentamos que a 
regulamentação do acesso a terapias não aprovadas 
atende a um importante interesse público da 
proteção da confiança pública no sistema de saúde 
e, portanto, é justificada. A lei deve permitir apenas 
o acesso a terapias experimentais com justificativas 
científicas suficientes. Sob certas condições, os 
pacientes podem cobrir os custos da terapia.
Palavras-chave: Legislação sanitária. Terapias 
não aprovadas. Terapias com células-tronco. 
Paternalismo médico. República Tcheca.
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Introduction
In a certain way, the medical research progresses both quickly and very slowly. With the 
pharmaceutical industry searching for new active substances—and the new uses of the previously 
known ones—there often arises hope for more effective cures of many serious health conditions. On 
the other hand, most medicinal products do not succeed in clinical trials and even if their potential 
becomes proven in the end, the process of clinical trials takes many years. At the same time, each 
clinical trial is designed to involve a certain number of participants who must fulfil the defined 
criteria (i.e. certain age or stage of progress of the disease). As a result, there are patients suffering 
from life-threatening or debilitating diseases who are not allowed to participate in clinical trials of 
medicinal products that could help them. It is very understandable that these people often try to 
get access to the new—and not yet registered—medicines any other way.
During the last decades, the paradigm of health care shifted from paternalism to 
the autonomy-based approach.3 It would seem that willing patients should be allowed to try 
unapproved therapies if they represent their last hope. The denial of access to these treatments 
could be understood as unduly limiting the patients’ autonomy of will and their right to health. 
However, the situation is rather complex.
Unfortunately, the vulnerability of such patients can be abused by the rogue vendors of 
unapproved cures. And to make the situation even worse, it is often not easy to recognise whether 
a certain provider of unregistered medicines is a deceiver or a well-meaning person who wishes to 
give the patients a spark of hope. The rules for the provision of unapproved therapies are often not 
entirely clear and even more ambiguous is the ethical evaluation of such situations.
In this article, we will analyse several related ethical and legal problems in order to 
determine whether limitations of the access to unapproved therapies are permissible from the 
perspective of the contemporary paradigm of autonomy-based health care. On the general level, 
we will ask whether the limitations of the access to unapproved therapies represent a paternalistic 
approach and if so, whether they are permissible from the ethical point of view.
Then, we will focus on two possible criteria of access to unapproved therapies 
which might be controversial. First, we will ask whether the criterion of sufficient scientific 
justification of the use of unapproved therapy is suitable (and, of course, how to measure this 
justification). Second, we will analyse whether the patients should be allowed to pay for the 
therapy. The debate on both of these criteria can be illustrated by the recent Czech case of stem 
cell therapy of ALS.
3 For a Czech experience with the rather rapid change of medical paradigm, cf. Šustek (2018).
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It may seem that the core of the problem is the conflict between the principle of non-
maleficence and the principle of autonomy as two of the leading principles of medical ethics.4 
However, we will argue that the problem is more complex since there must be also taken into 
account the public interest in a functioning health system.
It needs to be noted that while medical research encompasses also evaluation of medical 
devices and evaluation of new methods not yet established in clinical practice (Šustek, 2016b),5 this 
article focuses on the access to unapproved medicinal products. (p. 688).
1 International Perspectives
The debate on the rules for access to unapproved therapies is particularly strong in the 
USA nowadays, where there have been discussed the so-called Right to Try laws (Caplan, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the cases of provision of unapproved medicines are very usual in many countries. 
Most often, these controversies are connected to stem cell therapies:6 we can recall the vast numbers 
of clinics providing these therapies in the legal shadow in many countries of the world. (Maron, 
2016, & Šolc, 2018, p. 47-53). 
An interesting example might be the Italian case of a stem cell therapy called the Stamina 
method provided by the private Stamina Foundation. The method was harshly criticised for being 
ineffective, for failing to secure patient safety, and for the ignorance of certain scientific findings. The 
Stamina treatment, nevertheless, could have been provided to the patients since Italian law allows 
the use of an unregistered medicinal product outside of a clinical trial in patients whose health or 
life is under threat and for whose health condition there exists no therapeutic alternative. The use 
of the Stamina method did not stop until the new legislation was enacted, practically prohibiting 
the application of stem cell therapies in most new cases. (Šolc, 2018, p. 92-93.) The controversy 
was finally solved by the European Court of Human Rights in its decision in case Durisotto v. Italy 
of 6 May 2014, application No. 62804/13 (Durisotto v. Italy, 2014). According to the Strasbourg 
court, the limitation of access to unapproved therapy represents an interference with the right to 
respect for private and family life but it can be considered necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of health (in the sense of Article 8 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
Furthermore, the court stated that the level of permissible risk of unapproved therapy is to be set 
by the organs of particular states.
4 In their influential book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress (2013) identify four basic principles of 
medical ethics: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. (pp. 101-301). Beauchamp and Childress 
(2013) aptly denote paternalism as a conflict between beneficence and autonomy. (pp. 214-215). 
5 Under Czech law, the evaluation of medical devices is regulated by The Czech Republic Act No. 268 Coll., on Medical De-
vices (2014), and the evaluation of new methods not yet established in clinical practice is regulated by The Czech Republic 
Act No. 373 Coll., on Specific Health Services (2011b).
6 For an overview of the history of stem cell research in Brazil (Teixeira Zorzanelli, Speroni, Menezes, and Leibing (2017).
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2 Legal Regulation in the Czech Republic
According to Article 8 (1) of The Czech Republic Act No. 378 Coll., on Pharmaceuticals 
(2007) (hereinafter “Act on Pharmaceuticals”), it is generally only legal to prescribe, put on the 
market, or use registered medicinal products. However, consistently with the EU law, there are 
several exemption from this rule.7,8
The most practical and useful of these exemptions is the regime under Article 8 (3) and (5) 
of Act on Pharmaceuticals which is sometimes called compassionate use. This regime is also the only 
exemption which does not require the authorisation of either the State Institute for Drug Control 
(Státní ústav pro kontrolu léčiv, hereinafter “SÚKL”) or the Ministry of Health.
The compassionate use under Article 8 (3) and (5) of The Czech Republic Act No. 
378 Coll., on Pharmaceuticals (2007) is always related to an individual patient. Since no official 
authorisation is required, the treating physician is only obliged to immediately inform the SÚKL 
about the prescription or the use of an unregistered medicinal product. There are several cumulative 
conditions for compassionate use under the law. There are certain conditions regarding the medicinal 
product intended to be used.9 There must be no medicinal product with the same composition or 
analogic therapeutic properties in the distribution or in circulation on the market in the Czech 
Republic. Furthermore, the use of the medicinal product must be sufficiently justified by scientific 
knowledge. The medicinal product cannot contain any genetically modified organism.
The physician is obliged to inform the patient (or their legal representative) about the 
intent to use an unregistered medicinal product and about the consequences of the treatment. If the 
patient cannot be informed due to their health condition, the physician will immediately provide 
the information when it becomes possible. The fact that the medicinal product is unregistered must 
also be noted in the prescription.
3  The Czech Case of an ALS Stem Cell Therapy
After Sweden, the Czech Republic was the second country in Europe where there was 
successfully derived a stem cell line. (Kuře, 2009, p. 67). It is not surprising that to this day, the 
7 Apart from the below-mentioned regime under Article 8 (3) and (5) of The Czech Republic Act No. 378 Coll., on Pharma-
ceuticals (2007), these exemptions are the hospital exemption for advanced therapy medicinal products (Sections 49a and 
49b of Act on Pharmaceuticals), the specific treatment programmes utilising unregistered human medicinal products (Sec-
tion 49 of Act on Pharmaceuticals), and the temporary authorisation of the Ministry of Health in case of an exceptional 
situation (Section 8 (6) of Act on Pharmaceuticals).
8 For a more detailed analysis of the exceptions from the prohibition of the use of an unregistered medicinal product in the 
Czech Republic, cf. (in the Czech language). (Šolc, 2018, pp. 191-197).
9 It must either be registered in another state, or be an advanced therapy medicinal product whose manufacturer is a holder 
of a permission to manufacture the relevant dosage form in the scope corresponding to the permission to manufacture 
evaluated medicinal products issued by the SÚKL. Cf. Article 8 (3) of The Czech Republic Act No. 378 Coll., on Pharma-
ceuticals (2007).
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country has seen several cases of controversial stem cell therapies. The most famous one regarded 
the application of experimental stem cell therapy of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS).10 The case 
was made public in a TV report broadcasted in November 2015 (Obchod, 2015) and immediately 
attracted wide media attention. A clinical trial of the therapy was undergoing at the Motol University 
Hospital in Prague, one of the largest hospitals in Europe.11 At the same time, a team led by a Czech 
scientist Professor Eva Syková provided the therapy to the patients who were not eligible for the 
trial. From the legal perspective, the stem cells were applied under the regime of the compassionate 
use according to Section 8 (3) and (5) of Act on Pharmaceuticals. Syková’s team allegedly informed 
the patients that it would be possible to apply stem cells outside the frame of the trial but that they 
would have to cover the costs of the cultivation of stem cells. Officially, patients were not allowed 
to pay directly for their treatment and their financial contribution was labelled as a donation for 
research. While stem cells were cultivated by the private company Bioinova, the donations were 
made to the non-governmental organisation Buněčná terapie (Cell Therapy) which was chaired by 
Syková and which had its registered office at the same address as Bioinova.
Syková later stated that nobody was promised the therapy based on the donation. 
Nevertheless, the donation was a necessary condition for the patients to be provided with the 
therapy. The amount of payment was approximately 150.000 CZK (approximately 5.750 EUR). 
While the sum could reflect the real costs of the cultivation of stem cells for one patient, many 
critics considered it highly unethical to demand money for the experimental treatment.
The case was a high-profile one not only because of the gravity of ALS. Eva Syková is 
one of the well-known faces of Czech science and the most cited Czech female scientist (“Žebříčku 
Nejcitovanějších“, 2018). At the time, Eva Syková held several important functions including a 
seat in the Senate and the position of the director of the Institute of Experimental Medicine of the 
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. It might be noted that the Institute owned 43 per cent 
share in Bioinova. Furthermore, Bioinova was the sponsor of the clinical trial undergoing at the 
Motol University Hospital.
The Commission for the Scientific Integrity of the Academy of Sciences found an 
important violation of research ethics in the actions of Syková’s team. The main problem, though, 
was not seen in the payments but in the insufficient scientific justification of the therapy. It had not 
yet completed a clinical trial anywhere in the world. The only promising results were achieved in 
testing on animals. Nevertheless, Eva Syková and other members of her team were not sanctioned.
In May 2016, a new TV report (Obchod, 2016) accused Syková’s team of requesting 
the donation from several patients for inclusion in the clinical trial. The scheme was allegedly 
10 Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS; also known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease) is a motor neuron disease that leads to complete 
paralysis. Death usually comes in five years after the onset of disease. Physicist Stephen Hawking probably suffered from 
a very slowly progressing form of ALS. Cf. “Amyotrophic Lateral” (2019) and also (Harmon) 2012.
11 In 2010, the Motol University Hospital was listed as the fourth largest hospital in Europe with its 2 410 beds. Cf. “Europe’s 
10” (2010). 
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supported by two Motol physicians. The situation was now even more alarming than before: 
payment for participation in a clinical trial represents a direct violation of Act on Pharmaceuticals 
and the fundamental rules of research ethics. The consequences were rather serious. Eva Syková was 
removed by the then President of the Academy of Sciences Professor Jiří Drahoš from her function 
of the director of the Institute of Experimental Medicine of the Academy of Sciences.12 Syková 
also resigned from her position of the first vice-chairman of the Czech Government’s Research, 
Development and Innovation Council. Her reputation was severely damaged. The NGO Buněčná 
terapie ceased to exist. An internal investigation in the Motol University Hospital concluded that it 
was not proven that participation in the trial was conditioned by the payment. Some patients—but 
not all of them—were given back their donations.13
The questions we are considering in this article are demonstrated in a very sharp light in 
the described case regarding the application of stem cells outside of the clinical trial. If the patients 
were given the last hope, was it not paternalistic to condemn the practice? From the ethical point 
of view, did the problem consist rather the insufficient scientific justification, or in the fact that the 
patients paid for the therapy?
Before we explore these questions, we might ask whether the ethical and/or legal evaluation 
of the case should be different if the patients’ health really benefited from the therapy (which was 
not the case). Legal regulation of medical research—as well as the prevailing ethical approach to 
it—is largely categorical, assessing the permissibility of research practices on their inherent qualities 
and not on their consequences. That is a reasonable protection against attempts to justify highly 
unethical research by its possible benefits for mankind. The pioneer of medical research ethics Dr. 
Henry K. Beecher stressed that a clinical study is ethical or unethical from its start regardless of the 
value of its scientific contributions.14 We fully agree with this notion.
4 Limitation of Access to Unapproved Therapies as a Paternalistic Approach?
Generally, personal freedom is limited not only to protect the rights of others but, in 
cases of sufficiently intensive public interest, also to protect the person from their own decision. 
The latter category typically consists in situations when a person acts in a way which endangers 
certain personal value that also has crucial importance for the society and, therefore, is protected 
by the law. Even though it might seem that a fully capable person is protected from themselves 
by the law—which would arguably be an absurd effort—it is more accurate to say that a certain 
value which the person bears is protected as important for the society as a whole. For example, 
12 Ironically, Jiří Drahoš replaced Eva Syková in the Senate two years later. 
13 For an analysis of the case, cf. Šolc (2018, p. 51-53). Cf. also, for example, Dostál (2014) and Rychlík (2016).
14 As cited (in Czech translation) in Munzarová (2005, p. 48). The quote is not original; it was translated back to the English 
language by the author of this article.
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a person cannot relinquish their fundamental rights. Therefore, a person is not allowed to grant 
a completely free and informed consent to being killed, since human life is understood as one of 
the very basic values of our society. Even freedom in a more fundamental meaning is protected 
against an individual’s free decision, for example, the decision to sell oneself to slavery. Among other 
highly protected values, there is, for example, the respect to the human body which results in the 
prohibition of its commercialisation so nobody is allowed to sell their organs15 or to undergo drastic 
cosmetic procedures that would be deemed mutilating by the society.16
It is, therefore, necessary to ask what value is protected by the limitations of access to 
unapproved therapies and whether this value is important enough to outweigh the autonomy of 
will. One of the protected values is, apparently, the health of the person seeking therapy. If we 
focused solely on the value of health, however, ethical and legal differentiation between the access 
to unapproved and approved therapies might prove very difficult.
Unapproved therapies are usually connected to a higher risk to the patient’s health. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the law sets a certain limit on health risks a person is allowed 
to take. On the general level, this is true. In many instances, the law imposes an obligation on an 
individual to take measures to protect their own health. Examples of this approach are familiar from 
everyday life: obligatory seatbelts for drivers and passengers in cars and helmets for motorcyclists, 
the rules of employers’ responsibility for harm which motivate them to force their employees to use 
protective equipment (such as helmets on construction sites) etc. In all these instances, the law seems 
to prefer an individual’s health over their free will, while the proportionality between these limitations 
of autonomy of will and public interest on the protection of individual health can be questionable. At 
first sight, the limitation of access to unapproved therapies is just another of these cases. 
However, unregistered medicinal products are not necessarily more risky in all cases. There 
might be medicinal products that are not yet approved but with less reasonably presumed risks than 
some registered medicines, especially those used to treat more serious health conditions. Even more 
importantly, the risk-benefit ratio17 might be more favourable in some unregistered medicines than 
in most of their registered counterparts. It can be even argued that for a patient who is dying from 
an incurable disease, the risk-benefit ratio is almost always positive,18 which is not true for many 
registered medicinal products. At the same time, the most controversial cases of denial of access to 
15 For a brief analysis of the concept of commercialisation of the human body in relation to the selling of the body parts, cf. 
Šustek and Šolc (2018, pp. 201-208).
16 A recent example is an English body modification practitioner who was convinced for causing grievous bodily harm with 
intent which consisted in a tongue splitting, the removal of an ear and the removal of a nipple for willing clients. Cf. Pegg 
(2019).
17 The risk-benefit ratio can be best understood as a ratio between the probability and magnitude (importance) of an antic-
ipated benefit on the one hand and the probability and magnitude (severity) of anticipated harm on the other hand. Cf. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p. 230).
18 In the context of medical research, we agree with Resnik (2018) who believes that a dying patient may reasonably par-
ticipate in a study even if they expect they might die as a result of participation. The prospect of treatment which was 
provided by the participation in the study might outweigh its very high risks. (p. 167).
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unapproved therapies, understandably, involve the said category of patients. It is not easy to argue 
for this denial on the basis of the protection of the health of someone who has a prognosis of a very 
short life of poor quality. Therefore, it could be argued that in case of a positive risk-benefit ratio, 
even unapproved therapies should be accessible to fully informed patients under certain conditions.
Moreover, when compared to the participation in a clinical trial, the provision of an 
unapproved therapy outside the trial’s frame might not be the worse option. While the investigators 
must strictly follow the protocol of the trial, the treatment based on compassionate use of the drug 
can be more individualised. Furthermore, the subject of the trial might undergo tests or procedures 
which aim is the collection of data and not the benefit to the subject. (Resnik, 2018, p. 182). While 
it might seem paradoxical, the patient’s health can arguably be better protected by the provision of 
the unapproved drug outside the clinical trial in certain cases.
However, health and autonomy are not the only values that are protected by medical 
law. This can be demonstrated in a wider clinical context. The patient’s consent is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for the legal provision of health services. Even with fully informed and 
free consent, health professionals are only allowed to provide their services in accordance with the 
professional standards.19 In the Czech Republic, compliance with medical professional standards is 
usually called the provision of health care de lege artis as opposed to the non-lege artis provision in 
breach of the said standards. The standard is defined in Article 4 (5) of The Czech Republic Act No. 
372 Coll., on Health Services (2011a), as “the provision of health services according to the rules of 
science and acknowledged medical procedures with the respect to the individuality of the patient 
and with regard to the particular conditions and objective possibilities”.
In other words, the patient cannot grant informed consent to services that would breach 
the professional standards and expect these services will be provided. For health professionals and 
providers of health services, such provision would represent a breach of law. If we tried to explain 
this by the protection of patients’ health—provided the patients are fully informed—we would 
face once again the above-mentioned problems related to the protection of fully capable persons 
from themselves. Furthermore, it would conflict with the fact that activities of various natural and 
spiritual healers, none of which is evidence-based, are legal.20
19 According to Section 30 of The Czech Act No. 40 Coll., Criminal Code (2009) the consent of the aggrieved party with per-
sonal injury does not exclude criminal responsibility with the exception of the consent with medical procedures which, at 
the time when they were carried out, were in accordance with the law and the standards of medical science and practice.
20 Even though the healer can be held liable for the harm which was caused by the failure to proceed with due professional 
care. Since the healer undertakes to care for the health of the patient, she enters into the contract for health care with the 
patient under Section 2636 and following of the Civil Code (which applicability is broader than that of Act on Health 
Services). Therefore, the standard of due professional care (Section 2643 (1) of the Civil Code) can be applied to the healer. 
The healer ’s activity is, nevertheless, legal: the healer is only liable for the breach of contractual obligation. Cf. Šustek 
(2016c, p. 274).
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The described limitations of the legal provision of health services are, in fact, required by 
the protection of the integrity of the medical profession, health systems, and medicine as such.21 
Regular provision of health care not corresponding to the professional standards would significantly 
diminish patients’ trust in health professionals. Even if providers of health services were fulfilling 
their obligation to inform the patients of the non-lege artis character of proposed therapy, patients 
might (and probably would) start to feel like the subjects of rather uncontrolled experiments.22 While 
in some cases a bold therapy approach might have very good outcomes, on average the numbers of 
cases of iatrogenic harm would inevitably increase. The overall confusion and the decrease of trust 
in the health system would indirectly endanger the health and lives of many patients who would be 
reluctant to seek health services. In the end, the libertarian approach to the non-lege artis therapies 
might result in a public health crisis.
We can conclude that the principle of limiting the access to unapproved therapies is no 
more paternalistic approach than the prohibition of the provision of health services in a non lege artis 
manner. On the general level, it is justified by an important public interest.
5 Sufficient Scientific Justification
For the above-outlined reasons, there is a strong public interest in prohibiting the provision 
of the non-lege artis health services. There could arise the question of whether the provision of 
unapproved therapies outside the frame of clinical trials should not be banned without exception.
For determination of whether the certain clinical procedure was in accordance with 
the professional standards, there are usually used recommendations issued by medical societies 
(professional societies of the Czech Medical Association of J. E. Purkyně) and other guidelines. Even 
though these documents are non-binding, they express important opinions of the expert community 
(or its significant part) on the safety, efficiency, and suitability of particular therapies. Any deviation 
from these guidelines can only be considered de lege artis if it is sufficiently justified. (Šustek, 2016c, 
pp. 276-277.)
It is the nature of unapproved therapies that they are not yet recommended in any 
guideline. It is also their nature that their safety, efficiency, and suitability is being tested and there 
can be no expert opinion on them other than hypotheses which are yet to be verified or falsified. It 
21 Since these limitations are not based on grounds of the patient’s benefit, it can be argued that they are actually not pa-
ternalistic. In a similar way, Beauchamp and Childress argue that a refusal to provide a certain health service with the 
aim of protection of the patient’s health represents passive paternalism. However, the refusal to perform an intervention 
on the basis of the physician’s conscience „may not be a paternalistic decision“. The difference lies in the fact it may not be 
paternalistic to deny certain intervention to the patient in order to protect values which exist outside of the patient. Cf. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013, pp. 225-226).
22 As Resnik (2018) puts it with regard to medical research, “[r]isks that materialize can [. . .] undermine the public’s trust in 
the scientific enterprise” (pp. 166-167).
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could seem that unapproved therapies cannot be provided de lege artis since the standard of lex artis 
does not even apply to them.
However, we believe that the lex artis standard also has a broader meaning than the proven 
medical procedures. In Czech legal doctrine, there is known the term “lex artis largo sensu”, the lex 
artis in the broad sense, which encompasses organisational, communicational, or administrative 
aspects of the provision of health services. (Šustek, 2016c, p. 266). The requirement of the provision 
of health services on the appropriate professional level is, therefore, not limited to compliance with 
standard medical procedures.  In a similar way, the concept of lex artis can be expanded with regard 
to medical research. It should be understood more broadly as any action which is reasonably required 
from a health professional in a certain situation based on relevant legal (and also extra-legal) norms. 
(Šolc, 2018, p. 207).
An unapproved therapy can arguably be provided de lege artis in this broad sense if certain 
conditions of its provision are defined and fulfilled. It is reasonable to believe that the fundamental 
criterion should be scientific justification as it is required in Czech law by Article 8 (3) of The 
Czech Republic Act No. 378 Coll., on Pharmaceuticals 2007. While it is legal for non-professionals 
to provide services allegedly improving health with no scientific basis, it should not be so for the 
providers of health services (as they are defined in Act on Health Services). The minimum scientific 
justification is, apparently, open for discussion. The very minimal level of justification is that 
the medicinal product has successfully undergone all phases of preclinical research (including the 
testing on tissues and animals) and is ready for a clinical trial on human subjects. It would be highly 
inconsistent and dangerous both for the patients and the integrity of biomedicine to consider a 
certain medicinal product not yet prepared for a clinical trial and, at the same time, ready for clinical 
use. For the reasons outlined above, this is true even in patients for whom the medicinal product 
would represent their (real or perceived) last hope.
We would argue that the readiness for a clinical trial is still not a sufficient criterion. The 
results in animal tests, even if promising, can be very misleading for the patients. The scientific 
knowledge which is necessary to justify the use of an unapproved drug should be related to the 
drug’s basic effects on the human organism. Otherwise, the patients would be provided with 
therapies of only presumed effects on the human body and their hope would be based on illusion in 
the vast majority of cases.
There are three phases of clinical trial preceding the registration of the medicinal product. 
In Phase I, the basic functioning of the drug in the human organism is tested. In more detail, 
there is studied pharmacokinetics (the absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion of the 
drug23), pharmacodynamics (the effects of the drug on the body and the relationship between the 
23 For the definition of pharmacokinetics, cf. Harvey, Clark, Finkel, Rey, and Whalen (2012, p. 1).
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drug concentration and the magnitude of the organism’s response24), and the tolerability of the 
drug. Based on the results of Phase I, the dosing of the medicinal product is optimised for the 
next stages. (Cook, Hansen, Siu, & Abdul Razak, 2015, pp. 997-1007). The Phase I is usually based 
on a collaboration with healthy volunteers: for this reason, this is the only phase in which the 
participants can receive monetary remuneration. (Šustek, 2016a, p. 694). Patients suffering from 
the health condition which the medicinal product aims at are involved in cases when the provision 
of the drug to healthy volunteers would be unethical, such as in case of cytotoxic drugs intended 
for oncological patients. (Wiffen, Mitchell, Snelling, & Stoner, 2012, p. 110). The patients suffering 
from the disease are most often allowed to participate starting from Phase II of the trial when 
there is further assessed the safety and efficiency of the medicinal product. In Phase III, the drug is 
compared with medicinal products that are registered for the same indication.25
We suggest that the most appropriate time to allow the provision of unregistered 
medicinal products is after the completion of Phase I. This approach has several advantages. Earlier 
use of the drug would be connected with an extreme level of uncertainty including its dosing. On 
the other hand, waiting for the completion of Phase II would exclude many patients from access to 
unregistered therapies. While the average time between the start of Phase I and the completion of 
Phase III is eight years, Phase I usually only takes several months. (Hlavatý, 2016, p. 67). The criterion 
of completed Phase I, therefore, seems to balance the proportionality between the threshold of 
minimum scientific knowledge justifying the use of the drug and the interest of the eligible patients 
to seek unapproved therapies. Furthermore, it ensures an equal approach to all the patients seeking 
the unregistered drug. Since clinical trials are most often open for them since the start of Phase II, 
it is arguably reasonable to allow those who cannot participate at the trial to access the drug at the 
same time and not earlier or later.
The criterion of scientific justification needs clarification. Each case is to a relatively 
high extent specific in this area, and no regulation can be expected to sufficiently anticipate all 
aspects that might be relevant in particular cases. Nevertheless, it would be recommendable if 
expert societies issued broad guidelines on the matter, which could be then used by the clinical 
practice to establish a more reliable standard of lex artis. In the beginning, it should be made clear 
that the use of an unregistered medicinal product is allowed after the completion of Phase I of 
the clinical trial.
Nevertheless, we might recall the case of stem cell therapy provided by Eva Syková’s 
team to remind us that the mere fact that there is an ongoing clinical trial on patients suffering 
from the relevant disease does not suffice to justify the compassionate use of a medicinal product. 
There should be established a certain minimal standard of promising results in human patients. 
24 For the definition of pharmacodynamics, cf. Harvey et al. (2012, p. 25).
25 For an introduction to the phases of clinical trials, cf. (in the Czech language) Šolc (2018, pp. 146-150). For a brief overview, 
cf. “Phases of” (2019).
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This standard would primarily encompass the data on the efficacy of the therapy. In cases of 
therapies aiming at less grave health conditions, it would be necessary to wait longer for reliable 
data on safety. From this perspective, the proportionality between the risks and potential benefits 
of the therapy—given the nature and prognosis of the patients’ health condition—will always be 
the crucial aspect.
6 Payment for Unapproved Therapies
If the use of unregistered medicinal products – under certain conditions – represents the 
de lege artis provision of health services, there needs to be clarified whether it can be legally paid 
by the patient. There are several options for payment for these therapies. We can think of the 
payment from the (public or private) health insurance,26 the obligatory payment from the drug 
manufacturers who sponsor clinical trials, the payment from some special fund, etc. It is a very 
complicated question which cannot be analysed in this article. The problem arises when, for some 
reason, the provision of an unapproved therapy in an individual case is not covered and the only 
option for the patient is to pay for the therapy.
We demonstrated that the limitations of access to unapproved therapies do not only serve 
the aim of the protection of patient’s health but also the integrity of medicine and the health 
system. With regard to the payment, the protected value on the side of the patient is rather their 
financial situation or, from a broader perspective, their right to private and family life. A very 
expansive therapy can in some cases endanger the patient’s livelihood, housing, and their ability 
to pay for basic goods and services. This is the reason why modern society, especially in European 
countries which value social solidarity, shifts many costs incurred by unexpected and unfavourable 
events (such as a natural disaster or a disease) from the affected individuals to herself. However, if 
the society cannot cover the costs of unapproved therapy, or if it fails to do so for any other reason, 
it does not seem to be just to prohibit the patient from covering these costs. We will try to outline 
the reasons why we believe so.
It is obvious that the patient is, in a certain way, forced to pay for the therapy. Nobody 
would want to undergo an experimental medical treatment if it was not necessary (or, more precisely, 
the willingness to undergo an unnecessary medical treatment is itself a psychiatric diagnosis).27 
However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that the payment is forced upon the patient by the 
26 In the Section 16 (1) of Czech Republic Act No. 48 Coll., on Public Health Insurance (1997), states that “[in] exceptional 
cases, the respective health insurance company covers health services otherwise not covered by the health insurance com-
pany if the provision of such services is the only option from the perspective of health condition of the insured”. According 
to Section 16 (2), the prior consent of the health insurance company’s review physician is required with the exception of 
cases when the delay could result in harm to the insured person.
27 A person suffering from Münchhausen syndrome pretends to be ill in order to provoke sympathy of others and to being 
cared for by them. Sometimes, they seek medical treatment for their alleged health condition. Cf. “ICD-11 Diagnosis” 
(2019).
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society’s decision to allow the option of this payment. First of all, the patient still can make a 
fully informed decision not to make the payment: it is their right, not duty. The term force can 
only be used here in a weaker sense than actual coercion or another type of external force which 
eliminates the individual’s will. Secondly, even in this weaker sense, the patient is forced to make 
the payment by their health condition (an objective situation in which they find themselves) and 
by the society’s decision not to provide the payment, not by the option to pay for the treatment. It 
would be untenable to claim that it is the patient’s right to pay for the treatment what diminishes 
their autonomy of will and unduly forces them to make the payment. 
If the patient was to be protected against their own financial decisions based on their 
medical needs, it would have to be illegal to buy any health services, medicines, or medical devices 
which are not covered by the public health insurance or otherwise paid for by the society. It is easy 
to see that this approach is not empowering the patient’s autonomy of will but, in fact, poses a 
significant restriction on it.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to ensure that the patient’s decision making is based on the 
knowledge of true and sufficient facts regarding their health condition, prognosis, alternatives 
to the treatment, the nature of the treatment, and associated risks. It is vital that the patient is 
aware not only of the fact that the treatment is experimental but also of a low probability of the 
positive outcome. This fact must not be merely hidden among other information in an informed 
consent form. The provider of the treatment must make sure that the patient fully understands 
that while the treatment might be their last hope, it is, in fact, unlikely to significantly improve 
their health conditions. Some experimental treatments are objectively more promising than others, 
and this needs to be reflected too. If there are already available some exact data regarding the 
treatment’s efficiency, they need to be disclosed to the patient. However, what is most important 
is the patient’s understanding of the basic structure of the situation: there is hope but (in most 
cases) it is very uncertain and little. If the informed consent serves to at least partly equalize the 
information asymmetry in the physician-patient relationship (Salač, 2019), the information on 
the true probability of health benefits is crucial. Upon this knowledge, the patient can make their 
informed decision based on their personal values.
In order to protect the integrity of medicine and health systems, it is necessary to ensure that 
the direct payment from the patient will not lead to an enrichment of anyone involved. Therefore, 
it is imperative that the payment does not exceed the real costs of the treatment. Otherwise, it can 
never be guaranteed that the provider will not be financially motivated to misinform the patient or 
to unduly influence their decision. Both the real risk of these illegitimate practices and the suspicion 
in which all the providers of experimental therapies would find themselves arguably outweigh any 
positive impact of allowing the financial motivation to provide said therapies.
Looking back to the case of Eva Syková, we agree with the Commission for the Scientific 
Integrity of the Academy of Sciences’ conclusion that the insufficient scientific justification of 
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therapy represented a more serious problem than the fact that the patients were required to pay for 
it. It was the combination of a very low probability of therapy’s effect and the request for payment 
that made the behaviour of the therapy’s providers highly unethical. In our opinion, the payment 
itself would be ethically permissible if there were promising results in humans and if the patients 
were fully informed regarding the probability of beneficial effects of the therapy.
Conclusion
This article was dedicated to the analysis of limitations of the access to unapproved 
therapies as a practice which seemingly contradicts the autonomy-based paradigm of health law 
and medical ethics. Under Czech law, the access to unregistered medicinal products usually takes 
the form of compassionate use according to Article 8 (3) and (5) of The Czech Republic Act No. 378 
Coll., on Pharmaceuticals (2007). A recent case of unapproved ALS stem cell therapy provided by 
the team lead by Professor Eva Syková on the basis of compassionate use was presented as a glaring 
example of the most serious ethical questions: whether the limitations of the access to unapproved 
therapies are overtly paternalistic, whether (and how) the provided unapproved therapy has to be 
scientifically justified, and whether the patients should be allowed to pay for it.
We argued that it would be questionable to justify the limitations of the access to 
unapproved therapies based solely on the risks they pose to the patient’s health. Even though 
unregistered therapies are usually riskier than registered ones, it may not be always the case; 
furthermore, the risk-benefit ratio might be better for some unregistered medicines, especially if 
they might help patients suffering from incurable life-threatening diseases. On the other hand, the 
unregulated use of unapproved therapies would jeopardize the integrity of the medical profession 
and public trust in the health system. From this perspective, the limitations of the access to 
unapproved therapies have the same aim as the prohibition of the provision of health services in 
breach of professional standards—that is to protect the public interest on ethically working and 
trusted systems of health care. 
We further argued that the regulated use of unapproved therapies actually represents the 
provision of health services on the appropriate professional level. As a result, any breach of limitations 
of the access to unapproved therapies is nothing but a provision of health services not according 
to professional standards. While limitations of access to unapproved therapies might seem to be a 
unique relict of paternalism, they are in fact nothing but the application of professional standards in 
a broad sense. In this sense, they are not different from the rules limiting clinical practice in general.
Analysing suitable requirements for the use of unregistered medicines outside of clinical 
trials, we did not further focus on the non-existence of sufficient therapeutic alternative since it is a 
universally agreed condition. Nevertheless, we concluded that the use in a particular case must have 
sufficient scientific justification. The very minimum should consist in the completion of Phase I of 
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the clinical trial. The criterion of sufficient scientific justification needs to be clarified in more detail 
in the future. Guidelines issued by expert societies could prove very helpful in this regard. 
We also focused on the question of whether it should be legal for the patients to pay for 
their experimental therapy outside of a clinical trial. While the answer is positive, it is necessary to 
ensure that the payment does not exceed the real costs of the treatment and that the patient was 
properly informed of the experimental nature of the treatment and real chances of improvement of 
their health condition.
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Šustek, P. (2016a). Klinický výzkum. [Clinical Research.] In P. Šustek, & T. Holčapek, Zdravotnické 
právo. [Health Law]. Praha: Wolters Kluwer.
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